Balfour Papers at the British Library

Add. MSS. 49692

Bonham-Carter memorandum of 20 May, 1915, for the Prime Minister, on 10 Downing Street headed paper.

The Admiralty

In these remarks I assume that A.J.B. is to be appointed First Lord.

The question of the 1^st Sea Lord is of essential importance. The best choice would be Jellicoe, but it seems impossible to replace him in his command which position is at least as important as that of 1^st. If the possibility of a successor to Jellicoe is considered it will be found that all those who have had experience of high command can be discarded almost off hand viz Prince Louis, May, Bridgeman, Meux, Callaghan. Though the last named undoubtedly had a reputation amongst sailors for posessing the "fleet-eye" & there was considerable outcry from the fleet when he was displaced, yet there seems little doubt, that he is not up to the task.

Of the younger men Beatty has not the administrative capacity & Sturdee is not really a fit appointment.

I pass then to other alternatives for the post of First Sea Lord.

Against Fisher quite apart from the insurmountable obstacle of his recent antics there are very real objections. I think the right opinion amongst his friends at the Admiralty is that he is not up to the work.

He is still full of ideas & of the vitality to carry them through but is not capable of the sustained administrative action which is now needed at the Admiralty more than anywhere else.

Moreover he is a bad enemy & were he to return his first interest For administrative work for the past six months he has literally been 1^st S. L. by deputy Crease his private secretary drafting the minutes & [illegible, crossed out] initialling them 'F'.

Moreover he is a bad enemy & were he to return his first interest would be headhunting. He would part company not only with the present Board, which perhaps would be of no very great consequence apart from the creation of further disturbance, but also with Arthur Wilson and with Oliver the Chief of the Staff, who in the present circumstances is the lynchpin of Admiralty administration.

Lastly it would be impossible to give the Dardanelles operation a fair chance was he to remain.

Sir Henry Jackson is undoubtedly a possibility worthy of very serious consideration. He has been in the machine from the beginning of the war, his paper work is admirable & he would have the confidence of the Admiralty & I think of the Fleet.

On the other hand according to his own opinion he is not at present really sufficiently acquainted with the North Sea position as the nature of his work has not admitted of this.

There remains Arthur Wilson. He has the confidence of the Fleet & the necessary prestige with the public. His work during the past six months has been absolutely first class & it must be admitted that in his present position of adviser the Navy reaps the full benefit of his experience knowledge & powers. The experience of the war has toned down his fancy & moreover he will be restrained by Oliver his closest friend in the Service with whom he works admirably. The objection to his being placed in a position of actual responsibility is that he is inclined to overwhelm himself with detail & he himself has informed you that in the absence of W.S.C. he does not feel that his health will permit him to undertake the duties of 1^st S. L.

There is however a solution to these objections. For years the Admiralty war arrangements includes a provision for the appointment of an additional Sea Lord to relieve the 1^st Sea Lord [underlined in blue pencil] of administrative & paper work & so leave him free to devote his energies to the big issues. If Sir Henry Jackson were appointed to such a post the arrangement would it seems certain be received with satisfaction at the Admiralty. Sir A. Wilson would in these circumstances certainly accept the post, but to guard against the possibility of overwork, he should be informed of the reason for Sir H. Jackson's appointment. If after a time he found the work too heavy Sir H. Jackson having then had the opportunity learning the naval position in all its respects could replace him[,] Wilson returning to his present post. Sir A. Wilson has a strong sense of public duty & will I am assured fall in with any arrangement compatible with his health which is thought best in the public interest.

 MBC

 20/5/15

Add. MSS. 49714

Letter of 6 November, ff. 156-157.

 H.M.S. Iron Duke

 19.11.16

My dear Mr Balfour

The period during which I have reflected on the question of my coming to the Admiralty has strengthened the conviction which I formed whilst in London, that I could do no really useful work in the position proposed. In any subordinate post I should either embarrass the 1^st Sea Lord, or I should alternatively be denied the power to be of much use. I think this is inevitable and it is not possible for me to take up such a post. I deeply regret having even suggested such a course, especially as it has placed you in a somewhat awkward position. I did it without sufficient reflection, being carried away by the serious nature of the submarine menace to trade.

I still think that the anti-submarine campaign should be conducted by an officer of experience, energy & power, but he must not be so senior as to make it awkward for the 1^st Sea Lord, and he should be assisted by younger officers of special ability. Admiral Duff would do it well, although I do not imagine he would be pleased at leaving the Grand Fleet. An alternative is Admiral Leveson, but I think for this particular work Admiral Duff would be preferable.

 Yours very sincerely

 J R Jellicoe

Letter concerning the command of the Grand Fleet, ff. 159-162,

 H.M.S. Iron Duke

 19.11.16

Mr dear Mr Balfour

 I have received your letter of the 16th inst

Much as I shall regret the severance of association with Sir Cecil Burney I agree that it will be best, under the circumstances relieve him at the conclusion of his time of command next month.

I sincerely hope that the notice to him will contain an appreciation of his work which has been of great value and of great assistance to me, and that a GCB may be awarded to him as a recognition of his work as second in command of the Grand Fleet. No doubt he will also be assured of the command of a Home Port.

Your recollection of our conversation respecting Admiral Burney's ability (form the point of view of health) to stand a prolonged strain, is correct. But instead of saying that he might possibly lack initiative on occasion, I think I said that he might err on the side of over caution.

You will no doubt remember that I have always stated I consider Admiral Madden better fitted for the Chief Command than is Admiral Beatty. I am bound to reiterate this opinion although I know that the decision which you announce is taken after much reflection.

I do not think it would be wise to appoint Admiral Beatty second in command when Admiral Burney is relieved if such an appointment involves his taking command of the 1^st Battle Squadron.

My reasons are : —

1. I do not imagine that he would care to give up command of the BCF for a Battle Squadron, unless assured of the Command in Chief very shortly.

1. In that event he would gain very little Battle Fleet experience by the change and there is therefore no advantage in making it.
   Exercises at sea in the North during winter are vyer difficult owing to the short days.

1. The position in the Battle Fleet would be very awkward. The Admirals Commanding Squadrons would have a feeling of soreness & the general unrest would be bad for the spirit of the Fleet.

1. The procedure would assume [assure?] two changes in the 1<supst</sup> Battle Squadron instead of one only.

1. It would prevent Admiral Madden taking command of the BCF (which command he should certainly be offered) unless he ceases to be Chief of Staff. To this I should demur at this stage.

If Admiral Beatty retains command of the BCF some of these objections would be [illegible] to some extent, and others would not arise.

If a vacancy arose in the Chief Command and Admiral Beatty succeeded to it, the situation would adjust itself and the awkwardness of his being second in command in the Battle Fleet would be avoided. I confess I should not look forward to retaining command under such conditions because I know their would be much soreness of feeling.

I hope that you will appreciate and agree with these arguments and that if it is decided to make Admiral Beatty second in command, that he will remain in the BCF. I am sure that the slight gain to him in Battle Fleet experience that might ensue from the alternative course would in no way compensate for the disadvantages I have pointed out.

Admiral Beatty should I think be requested to select his Chief of the Staff. If agreeable to both, I believe that Admiral Duff would be the best appointment. He has wide Battle Fleet experience and could in a way understudy Admiral Madden as well.

For the command of the 1^st Battle Squadron Admirals Heath and de Robeck are available. The former is the senior and eminently qualified. If it is considered that Admiral de Robeck's services give him the greater claim, Admiral Heath might relieve Admiral Sturdee when his 2 years expires in February next. I assume the same rule will be applied to him as to Admiral Burney & if so it would be as well to tell him at the same time as Admiral Burney.

Admiral W C M Nicholson of the Canada would be the best officer to relieve Admiral Duff.

These suggestions involve the minimum of changes & I hope would minimise any soreness of feeling.

I am not sure of what Admiral Jerram's wishes would be, but if he were for any reason to leave the 2^nd Battle Squadron, Admirals de Chair and Leveson would be suitable successors unless Admiral Callaghan were to go afloat again.

I know that Admiral Burney has just taken a house at Invergordon so that early notice to him would be desirable, if the decision is made, and I think Admiral Sturdee ought to be told at the same time.

 Yours very sincerely

 J R Jellicoe