Sturdee Remarks on Naval Strategy

A Few Remarks on the Main Naval Strategy of the War was a paper written by (then) Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee in 1916.

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1. The written by the late First Lord have raised doubts in the minds of many thoughtful people as to the wisdom of the general Naval strategy of the war. Curiously, they are the exact reverse of what he advocated when in office and as expressed in public speeches.

No doubt there is a feeling underruning the thoughts of the nation, which is only seldom expressed in the public Press that, due to its great preponderance, more is expected from our Fleet. Some offensive action was so often written about and discussed during the period from 1900 and onwards before the war, while the German Fleet was being built and formed, that it must still exist.

Many people then advocated, no doubt without knowledge, that we should prevent this fleet being increased, by threats of war. In ignorance of their past naval and military history they fondly imagined that a superior Navy could accomplish this, without even having voted for or raised and maintained an Army of any size. This prevailing ignorance, which still exists, may at any time rise and cause a feeling that there is a lack of offensive energy on the part of the Admiralty and the Fleet in general, and thus may have a prejudicial effect on the generous regard at present expressed for what our Fleet has done.

2. As I happened to be Chief of the War Staff at the Admiralty for the first three months of the war, and since then have been serving as an Admiral in Command afloat, I venture to write down my thoughts for what they are worth, having now had war experience both ashore and afloat.

3. I may say that, broadly, I am in entire agreement with our present strategical policy. It has the advantage of the support of our past Naval history, recent maritime history of other Powers, and in addition the experience obtained in the present war.

4. With regard to any criticism which may be made on the non-bombardment of the German coast, the relative power of "ships versus forts" has been the main controversy dividing the opinion of technical experts.

Our past history shows that, except in a few isolated instances, our Naval forefathers declined to pit a Fleet against a properly fortified base, when that base belonged to an efficient and powerful military Power.

Many reasons could be given which are even truer to-day than formerly. Modern inventions appear to have acted disadvantageously to the Naval attack:—

(a)	The main one was, and still remains, that a ship being the carriage of a battery of a gun is sinkable, while the shore battery of guns is unsinkable.
(b)	A further disadvantage is that a ship makes a very good target, silhouetted against the horizon, for the shore guns to aim at, and its battery of guns is perforce concentrated, while guns on shore can be dispersed and rendered nearly invisible from the ship. The whole water area commanded by the guns of a shore battery can be carefully marked off, guns laid and fired by most accurate instruments to be reasonably certain of hitting a ship as it comes into or passes through their commanded area.
(c)	The ship, however much the laying of the guns may be improved, can never possess the initial advantage of a shore battery. In fact, modern improvements have acted against ship seriously engaging shore batteries, and this without bringing in the influence of torpedoes and mines, which adversely affect the ship, and obviously cannot be used against shore batteries.

5. Colonel (now Major-General) C. E. Callwell in his work published in 1905 on "Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance," after treating the historical side very fully on page 165, sums it up very succinctly by saying:—

Had France, the weaker side at sea, during the war of the Revolution and Empire, been powerless on land, Bridport and St. Vincent and Collingwood would not have been obliged to lie off and on, in fair weather and foul, for months and months, watching the French armament in Brest, nor would Nelson have spent two most anxious years of his strenuous life maintaining a position of observation with a crazy Fleet ready to destroy or to pursue La Touche Treville should he put to sea from Toulon. The operation would have assumed a totally different aspect.

My reason for quoting this is that it seems so accurately to describe the present position.

The whole book is worthy of attention.

6. The attack on the Danish coast at Copenhagen by Nelson in 1801 is one of the great exceptions to the general principle of not using a Fleet to attack ships protected by serious fortifications, but history points out that in this case the situation was very critical at certain periods.

The successful bombardment of Algiers in 1816 by Lord Exmouth is another exception and a very striking one.

7. Against these must be taken the various proposals which may be found in the Admiralty Library and Record Office for attacking Brest and Toulon between 1793-1808. They appear to have been fully considered at the Admiralty and even referred to the Admiral in Command, who invariably rejected them unless a military force was added.

Coming to more modern times, the Naval bombardment of the forts of Sebastopol

Bibliography

• Jellicoe, Admiral of the Fleet The Right Hon. The Earl (1934). The Submarine Peril: The Admiralty Policy in 1917. London: Cassell and Company, Limited.